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CASE COMMENTS
COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS AND THE UCC
While the concept of a stock cooperative apartment corporation is
not new, it did not gain popularity in the United States until World War
II.1 Several factors share responsibility for the growth of this concept.
2
For many people one factor was the desire to own their dwellings without
the burdens normally attached to home ownership. Another was the secu-
rity evidenced by having a home in a socially desirable environment where
land was not available for purchase or where high cost made such a
purchase impractical. 3 Since the Second World War, growing urban pop-
ulations have created housing shortages, especially for the lower and mid-
dle income families. The financial support of the Federal Housing Admin-
istration4 to promoters has benefited these income groups and together
with favorable income tax regulations 5 has stimulated continuing interest
in this concept of housing.'
The creation of a cooperative has usually been in one of three forms, 7
the most popular of which is the corporate-proprietary lease form. Here,
a stock corporation is organized to obtain or construct an apartment
'Cooperatives apparently made an appearance in New York in the latter part of the
nineteenth century. At least the first known litigation was the case of Barrington Apt. Ass'n
v. Watson, 38 Hun 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886) which involved the validity of restrictions on
assignments of a lease from a sublessee to a third person.2For history and background of the development of cooperative apartments see Isaacs,
History and Development of the Co-operative Apartment, 5 PRAC. LAW., Nov., 1959, at
62; Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45 Bos. U.L. REv. 465
(1965).
3Whitebook, The Cooperative Apartment, 9 PRAC. LAW., Apr., 1963, at 25.
'National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1970). This section extended the authority
of the F.H.A. to permit the insurance of mortgages on cooperative apartment buildings.
5For a list of applicable tax sections see note 12 infra.
6Cooperatives should not be confused with condominiums, for while the general-purpose
of each is similar their character from a legal viewpoint is quite different. For detailed
discussions on condominiums see D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPER-
ATIVES (1970); MacEllven & Eagen, Condominium-A Symposium, 41 TITLE NEWS, Dec.,
1962, at 28; Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50
CAL. L. REv. 299 (1962).
74A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 633.2-.4 (1971). (1) The co-ownership plan is
designed so that all tenants own the entire premises as co-owners in fee simple as joint tenants
or as tenants in common with exclusive occupancy rights to a specific apartment. This plan
is seldom used and is impractical, for the joint tenancy has the disadvantage of requiring a
conveyance to all grantees simultaneously by means of a single instrument. Further, on the
death of one tenant, his interest inures to the other joint tenants. In the tenancy in common
plan there is the disadvantage of unlimited liability for any obligations incurred in the
maintenance or use of the building. (2) The trust form of organization is feasible but seldom
used, the greatest disadvantage being that the control of the enterprise must be vested in
trustees. (3) The corporate-proprietary lease form is discussed in the text.
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building which is to be operated on a cooperative basis. The corporation,
holding title to all the premises, determines the value of each apartment
and allocates the number of shares of stock in proportion to that value.
A prospective tenant makes a stock purchase which entitles him to a
proprietary lease., The proprietary lease is similar to an ordinary apart-
ment lease, but differs in several respects, the most obvious one being that
no rent is specified.9 The purchaser usually considers that he is buying a
house, but all he has is the corporation stock and a lease. It is this dual
purpose concept-a purchase of corporate stock and a purchase of a
proprietary lease-that has troubled those courts seeking to classify coop-
erative apartment stock. 0
This difficulty has been complicated by the fact that the cooperatives
have gained popularity only recently, and accordingly there is a paucity
of law on the subject. Those cases which have been decided are inconsist-
ent in applying the law to the tenant-stockholder. Indeed, his character,
when before a court, seems to take on a chameleonic quality and changes
to satisfy the controversy under consideration. For example, in the New
York case of Lacaille v. Feldman" the stock was classified as realty rather
than personalty to determine the priority for attachment of a tax lien,'
2
'Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
'Whitebook, supra note 3. The "rent" is in the form of a maintenance charge fixed by
the board of directors upon the basis of an estimate of the corporation's cost requirements
divided into the total number of issued and outstanding shares, reduced to a per share figure,
and payable monthly. In his article, Mr. Whitebook refers to other terms which may differ,
such as restrictions on transfer of interest, an unusually long term (40 or 50 years) with a
right of renewal, repairs to the interior being the responsibility of the tenant, restrictions on
sublessees, an escape clause, provision for removing an objectionable tenant, removal of
fixtures, mortgage, and provisions for amendment of the lease.
"0Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Associates, 37 App. Div. 2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1971).
"44 Misc. 2d 370, 253 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
"For other cases holding that cooperative stock has the character of realty see, e.g., In
re Pitts' Estate, 218 Cal. 184, 22 P.2d 694 (1933) (corporation held not to have proper lien
against lease of deceased tenant-owner; the court said it was not concerned with the designa-
tion given the instrument, but must look to the substance thereof, which was realty); Curtis
v. LeMay, 186 Misc. 853, 60 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1945) (stockholder given status
of landlord in suit to evict another from apartment represented by stock and lease he had
purchased); Justus v. Bowers, 167 Ohio St. 384, 148 N.E.2d 917 (1958) (stock held realty
rather than personalty for purposes of taxation).
In criminal cases a sale of the stock has been considered as the sale of realty and not
subject to securities regulation. Willmont v. Tellone, 137 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962); State v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).
The Internal Revenue Service has generally treated the ownership of the stock and lease
as realty as evidenced by the following code sections: INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(a)
[hereinafter cited as I.R.C.] (see Rev. Rul. 66-40, 1966-1 Cum. Bull. 277 for an interpreta-
tion of this section); I.R.C. § 121(A)(2) (and see special rule (d)(3) under this subsection);
I.R.C. § 216; I.R.C. § 1034(F). But see I.R.C. § 165(c)(3). See generally, Tax Problems
of the Cooperative Housing Corporation and their Tenant-Stockholders, CCH 1961 STAND.
FED. TAX. REP. € 3928 (June I, 1961).
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while in the same state the court in In re Miller's Estate
13 reasoned that,
considered separately, the stock and lease would be personalty, and the
fact that both were required to evidence ownership would not seem to
affect their legal classification."
The possible applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code
5 to coop-
erative apartment stock had never been considered until the recent deci-
sion in Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Associates.,"
6 dealing with the sale of
cooperative stock. In Silverman the plaintiff buyer brought an action to
recover a deposit declared forfeited by defendant seller because of buyer's
breach of a contract to purchase cooperative stock and a proprietary
lease. The court was faced with the task of determining whether the con-
tract dealt with realty or personalty, as the measure of damages would
differ accordingly. Having to operate without the aid of direct precedent,
the lower court treated the stock as realty," only to be reversed at the
appellate level where the higher court decided that cooperative stock was
personalty subject to the Uniform Commercial Code. The court rejected
a realty application.'8 Its primary consideration was whether the sale was
one of goods and subject to Article 2 of the UCC,19 or one of securities
subject to Article 8.10 Specifically, the court held that the stock was
"goods" as defined in the UCC and that damages could be recovered only
as provided for in UCC § 2-718.21 Two justices dissented, arguing that
13205 Misc. 770, 130 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
"For another case relating the stock to personalty see Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp.,
43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Civ. Ct. 1964) (stock and leasehold together considered
personalty in suit to require corporation to repair underflooring). Other cases considering
the stock as personalty in the construction of a will are In re Turner's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d
684, 233 N.Y.S.2d 108 (Sur. Ct. 1962); and In re Estate of Schlesinger, 22 Misc. 2d 810,
194 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sur. Ct. 1959).
"The Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as UCC) has been adopted
in the District of Columbia, Virgin Islands, and all states except Louisiana.
1"37 App. Div. 2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1971).
"18 UCC REP. SERV. 57 (1970), reports the decision of the lower court.
"1323 N.Y.S.2d at 44-45. The court pointed out that none of the classic clauses that
are found within the standard real estate contract were present and that the contract in fact
called for payment of the required stock transfer stamps.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(1). In this section "goods" are defined as "all
things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities (Article 8) and things in action."
"Article 8 deals with bearer bonds formerly covered by the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law and with registered bonds. It also covers certificates of stock, formally provided
for by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and additional types of investment paper not
previously covered by any uniform act.
"1Section 2-718 provides for liquidation or limitation of damages, and where, as here,
there is no liquidation clause, the seller is limited to twenty percent of the value of the total
performance for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or $500, whichever is
smaller.
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the UCC should not apply and that the cooperative stock should be
regarded as realty, since ownership thereof involved possession of so many
of the rights and obligations peculiar to fee ownership.2
If other courts agree with the reasoning of the majority in Silverman
that the UCC should apply, some much-needed uniformity would be
provided for the purchase or sale of cooperative stock and a proprietary
lease. The UCC itself is authority for a liberal construction of its provi-
sions to further its policies.3 The drafters' comments indicate that the
code is drawn flexibly enough to deal with novel and unusual types of
commercial transactions, 4 and for illustration cite with approval the New
York case of Agar v. Orda.2 Agar, decided in 1934 after the old Uniform
Sales Act 26 was passed, applied that Act to a contract for sale of choses
in action even though the coverage of the Uniform Sales Act was inten-
tionally limited to "goods" other than choses in action. In drawing its
conclusions the Agar court reasoned that while corporate shares are intan-
gible property, and for many purposes must be considered "things in
action,' '2 7 for practical purposes they are merged into stock certificates
which are treated by businessmen as property. Since they are treated in
the market place as "goods", the decision was that they were "goods"
and subject to the limited remedies provided for in The Uniform Sales
Act.2
11323 N.Y.S.2d at 46-47.
2'UNIFORNI CONIMERCIAL CODE § 1-102.
"Id., Comment I.
-264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934). Agar and Silverman dealt with the same basic
issue, a contract for the sale of corporate stock, except that in Agar it was the sale of 6
percent cumulative preferred stock in a corporation rather than cooperative apartment
stock.
26190 N.E. at 479-80. The Uniform Sales Act was promulgated in 1906 and was adopted
by 34 states and Alaska, the District of Columbia and Hawaii. Article 2 of the UCC is a
complete revision of the Uniform Sales Act. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-101, Com-
ment.
2190 N.E. at 481 includes in the definition of "goods" under the Uniform Sales Act
all chattels personal other than things in action.
21ln the Uniform Sales Act there could be an action for the price where title had passed
to the buyer. However, in an executory contract, even if the goods were tendered, the
common law rule was changed, and there could only be a claim for damages.
In contrast UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-709 (Sales) and 8-107 (Investment Se-
curities) provide for an action for price. The remedy in Section 2 is generally limited to
those cases where resale of the goods is impracticable or they have been destroyed after risk
of loss has passed to the buyer. If the seller retains the goods the action can only be sustained
after a reasonable effort to sell at a reasonable price. The comment to Section 8-107(2) states
that it is designed to follow the dictum in Agar v. Orda. The seller can maintain an action
under this section only for securities accepted and for rejected securities if efforts at their
resale would be unduly burdensome or there is no readily available market, as in the Agar
case.
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By analogy to the liberal approach employed in Agar, approved by
the drafters of the UCC, it is apparent that the Silverman court is on firm
ground, and, with all jurisdictions but one adopting the UCC, the machi-
nery is at hand to provide uniformity in transactions for cooperative
stock. It remains to be decided, however, whether the stock should be
governed by Article 8, which deals with investment securities, as well as
Article 2.29 In addition to the UCC's own suggestion that its provisions
not be narrowly construed, there is authority in case law for including
within Article 8 stock not specifically described by that Article.
A security is defined in § 8-102(l)(a) of the UCC as an instrument
which:
(i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities ex~hanges...
or commonly recognized. . . as a medium for investment; and
(iii) is either one of a class or series or. . . is divisible into a class
or series of instruments; and
(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property
or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer.
This definition has been liberally construed. In a New York case30
involving an oral contract for the sale of stock, the plaintiff argued that
as the stock contained limitations on its transfer and therefore was not a
type commonly involved in securities exchanges, the Statute of Frauds31
in Article 8 would not apply. The court dismissed the petition, holding
that the UCC's definition of a security was intended to include all shares
of stock, not only those dealt with by security brokers and their custo-
mers. A similar result occurred in a Virgin Islands case 2 where the U.S.
District Court held that a subscription to unissued stock of a corporation
was a security under Article 8 and a sale within the meaning of the Statute
of Frauds.
It might also be noted that the only reference to cooperative apartment
stock in the UCC is in the comment to § 8-204,3 and by inference it
"*323 N.Y.S.2d at 43. The court recognized the close relation to Article 8 and pointed
out its belief that if Article 8 were to apply the result would have been the same, for "even
if Article 8 (Investment Securities) is deemed to apply to cooperative apartment stock where
Article 8 is silent, Article 2 is applicable."
OPreviti v. Rubenstein, 3 UCC REP. SERV. 882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mem., 282
N.Y.S.2d 157 (App. Div. 1967).
3
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-319 contains a statute of frauds expressly designed
to apply to investment securities.
'2Cooper v. Vitraco, Inc., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 553 (D.V.I. 1970).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-204, Comment 3, provides:
Cooperative associations and ventures, as well as private clubs are gener-
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appears that there was no intention to prevent the stock from being in-
cluded in Article 8.
There are two problems which must be overcome if cooperative
apartment stock is to be included within Article 8. First, the comment to
§ 8-102 indicates that the securities included in Article 8 are.those regu-
lated by the Securities Act of 1933 or a state Blue Sky Law.u The Securi-
ties Act expressly exempts a cooperative housing corporatin from regula-
tion,3 as does the Securities Exchange Act of 193436 when the stock is sold
by a licensed real estate broker. In a parallel situation the shares are
usually exempt from state Blue Sky Laws where there is a lack of profit
motive; however, in some jurisdictions "profit" has been expanded so as
to make unsafe any dependence on its usual meaning in determining which
shares are exempt.3 7 The same comment of the UCC which creates this
problem also provides a logical solution in the statement that the defini-
tion is not limited to these regulated securities. Moreover, it points out
that the definition is functional rather than formal.3 1 It would be a reason-
able deduction, therefore, that this part of the definition would not bar
the admission of cooperative stock to the coverage of Article 8.
ally considered an exception to the rules against restrictions on transfer as
unreasonable restraints on alienation and are permitted for example to
require the consents of governing bodies such as a board of directors.
Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417
(1939).
MUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-102, Comment.
-See 17 C.F.R. § 230.235 (1971); 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 633.17(4)
(1971).
-17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-2 (1971). In addition, if they qualify, sales by others than real
estate agents are permitted. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(F)
(1970).
3Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1961) held that investment in a country club, not yet constructed, involved an element
of risk and a "return" was expected in one form or another, so the shares were a security
under the state law. In the case of Pine Grove Manor Section No. 1, Inc. v. Director Div.,
Dept. of the Treasury, 68 N.J. Super. 135, 171 A.2d 676 (1961), a "non-stock" cooperative
apartment corporation was involved. The court held that plaintiff was not exempted from a
corporation business tax as a non-profit corporation because there would be "profitable
advantages that inure to their benefit." On this precise issue a Pennsylvania court reached
the same conclusion in Commonwealth v. 2101 Cooperative, Inc., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 405,
affd per curiam, 408 Pa. 24, 183 A.2d 325 (1962).
State ex rel. Troy v. Lumbermen's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 58 P.2d 812 (1936), involved
a cooperative plan for a group sharing of medical expenses and it was held that the Blue
Sky Law applied. The court said profit was not necessarily a direct return by way of
dividends; a savings of expense was also a profit to the person benefited. Lumbermen's
Clinic was cited with approval in a similar holding in State ex rel. Russell v. Sweeney, 153
Ohio St. 66, 91 N.E.2d 13, 16 (1950).
3SNote 34 supra.
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The second problem is in the body of the definition of a security
wherein the stock is required to be "of a type commonly dealt in upon
securities exchanges . . or commonly recognized . as a medium of
investment . . . ." Since the cooperative corporation stock is accompa-
nied by a proprietary lease, it could be argued that it is not a type com-
monly dealt in upon exchanges and therefore would have to qualify as a
medium of investment. An investment has been defined in case law gener-
ally as the placing of capital or laying out of money with the intention to
secure income or profit from its employment. 9 As the UCC itself begs to
be construed liberally40 and the meaning of "profit" has been expanded
to include "profitable advantages that inure to one's benefif" or a
"savings of expense,"41 it follows that there is a rational basis for inclu-
sion of cooperative apartment stock within the class of securities covered
by Article 8.
With the advantageous exemption of cooperative stock from federal
control in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (except where it does not qualify), and its exemption from many state
Blue Sky Laws,42 cooperative stock remains unregulated in a large part
of the country. If it is denied coverage under the UCC, it will not be
covered under any uniform laws. Therefore, to foster uniformity the stock
should be included within the purview of Article 8, for unlike Article 2,
Article 8 deals generally with the issue, purchase and registration of secur-
ities. As the comments of the UCC point out, Article 8 was intended to
be read with Article 2, and where Article 8 is silent Article 2 is to supply
the needed guidance.4
3
Treating cooperative stock as realty or various forms of personalty
does not provide uniformity, while if the shares were brought within the
regulation of Article 8, there would be advantages to both buyer and
seller.44 For instance, if the stock is considered realty, there should be a
31SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F.
Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935); State v, Hofacre, 206 Minn. 167, 288 N.W. 13 (1939); State v.
Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920); In re Bowen, 141 Ohio




42By its analogy to realty and where the meaning of "profit" has not been liberalized,
cooperative stock has in some jurisdictions been exempted from state Blue Sky Laws.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105, Comment. This comment points out that while
investment securities are expressly excluded from the coverage of Article 2, the application
of a particular section of Article 2 by analogy to securities (as was done in Agar v. Orda) is
permissible when the reason of that section makes such application sensible, and the situa-
tion involved is not specifically covered by Article 8.
"'For a detailed consideration of other problems facing an attorney asked to represent
a prospective buyer of cooperative stock, see Jervis, Problems in the Purchase of a Co-
operative Apartment, 5 PRAC. LAW., Nov., 1959, at 83.
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title search and a recording of interest when a purchase is made; if an
investment security, Article 8 requires a registration of a transfer45 which
would provide notice of adverse claims and give some certainty of owner-
ship.46 Another advantage 7 would be § 8-319, the article's own Statute
of Frauds,4" which permits a more liberal signature requirement with none
being required if a writing is not rejected within ten days after confirma-
tion has been received. Minimum specifications for quality and price may
be established by business usage. Article 8 also has very precise attach-
ment and levy rules requiring an officer to actually and physically seize
the share before attachment is valid. 9 Also, this article provides for the
issuance of new certificates if the originals are lost or destroyed.50 Since
there appears to be no reason why an inclusion in Article 8 should ad-
versely affect the favorable treatment the corporation and its tenant-
stockholders enjoy under the Securities and Internal Revenue Acts, it is
apparent that Article 8 would provide the most comprehensive or satisfac-
tory regulation of transactions in this field of commerce. In the spirit of
uniformity called for in Agar51 and the realization that the interest has not
been given a name, as indicated in Lacaille v. Feldman,52 cooperative
stock and a proprietary lease should be denominated an investment secu-
rity within the UCC, and it only remains for the courts to do so.
DicKEY PLOWDEN RABUN
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-401 sets forth the duty of an issuer of stock to
register a transfer of stock when so requested.411d. § 2-107(3). This section provides for recording, if desired, of the contract for sale
as transferring an interest in land which is notice to third parties of the buyer's rights.
"Another potential advantage might appear in jurisdictions which still recognize a
spouse's dower right. If the stock is realty, the question arises if there should be a release of
dower when there is a transfer, while if it is considered a security under Article 8 this problem
should not arise.
8UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-319. This section contains the Statute of Frauds as
applied to the contracts for the sale of securities.
49Id. § 8-317. Not only is the attachment procedure set out, but also the method by
which a creditor may reach such a security.
"Id. § 8-405. This section also provides for protection of the issuer if notice is not
timely.
51Note 25 supra.
144 Misc. 2d 370, 253 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
